Big POCSO Ruling: Supreme Court Says Foundational Facts of Sexual Assault Must Be Proved Section 29 Presumption Can Apply
The Supreme Court has ruled that the statutory presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) cannot be pressed into service unless the prosecution first establishes the foundational facts of the alleged sexual assault — and unless the testimony of the child victim is itself found to be wholly credible and trustworthy.
A Bench of Justices Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran delivered the verdict in Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal & Anr., setting aside the judgment of the Calcutta High Court which had reversed the trial court's acquittal and convicted the appellant under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. The Court restored the acquittal recorded by the trial court on 13 March 2019.
What the Court Held
"Unless the evidence of the child victim is found to be wholly credible and trustworthy, the question of invoking the presumption solely on the strength of such a statement would not arise," the Bench observed. The foundational fact of sexual assault, the Court held, required something more than the deposition of PW-1, whose testimony before the trial court was materially at variance with what she was said to have told her mother.
Factual Background
The appellant, a tuition teacher, was accused of sexually assaulting his 14-year-old student on 17 July 2017. The allegation was that the appellant, after asking the other students to leave, inappropriately touched the prosecutrix. The prosecution examined ten witnesses in support of its case.
The prosecutrix (PW-1) stated that the incident took place at about 9:25 PM, that she disclosed it to her mother the same night, and that a complaint was lodged the following evening. During cross-examination, she admitted that her mother had declined permission for a medical examination. She further stated that the appellant's wife was in the kitchen at the time and that other parents were present in the verandah.
The mother (PW-2) confirmed that the disclosure had been made on the same evening, but conceded that the FIR was registered only the next day. She also admitted to refusing consent for a medical examination without offering any explanation.
Material Contradictions on Record
According to the mother's deposition, the prosecutrix had described how the appellant caressed her chest, pressed her breast, and brushed his knee against her thigh. However, when the prosecutrix herself deposed before the trial court approximately eight months later, she made no reference to the appellant having touched her leg. The Supreme Court treated this omission as a material contradiction that struck at the very credibility of the testimony.
A further witness deposed that she had dropped her son at the tuition on the same day and returned with the prosecutrix's mother — a piece of evidence suggesting that another student was present during the alleged incident. This testimony went unchallenged in cross-examination. The Supreme Court accepted it as an admitted position, observing that it cast serious doubt on the prosecutrix's version of an isolated encounter.
Trial Court's Findings
The trial court had acquitted the appellant, citing the prosecution's failure to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR, and the absence of a medical examination.
Where the Calcutta High Court Went Wrong
Reversing the acquittal, the Calcutta High Court had pressed into service the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act and convicted the appellant under Section 8.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the High Court had correctly articulated the legal position — that once foundational facts are established, the burden of proof shifts to the accused. However, the High Court had omitted the anterior question: whether those foundational facts had in fact been proved on the record of this case.
Significance of the Delay and the Refused Medical Examination
The Bench observed that the nearly day-long delay in lodging the FIR assumed particular significance given that the prosecutrix's father was himself a serving police officer. It further held that the unexplained refusal to permit a non-invasive medical examination warranted an adverse inference against the prosecution.
Ratio Laid Down
Holding that the prosecution had failed to establish the foundational facts of the alleged offence, and that the child victim's testimony was not wholly trustworthy, the Supreme Court concluded that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act could not have been drawn against the appellant. The reversal of acquittal by the High Court was accordingly set aside, and the trial court's judgment of acquittal was restored.
Case Details
Case Title: Debraj Dutta v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
Case No.: SLP (Crl.) No. 16838 of 2025
Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kumar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran
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